A Short-Term Strategy Against Terrorism

by Frank Creel (Virginia)

October 1, 2001

Consistent with its analysis of September 17 (see Black Tuesday article), the Independent National Committee offers the following battle plan for accomplishing the short term objective outlined there, i.e., achieving justice for the nearly 6,000 American citizens who died in the September 11 terrorist attacks.

1. Insert small special operations teams in various places throughout Taliban-controlled territory. Their mission will be to conduct reconnaisance in support of the developing, larger military mission; engage and destroy smaller elements of the Taliban militia and, if possible, bin Laden's fighters and cadres; and, when larger units are located, direct the delivery of superior U.S. firepower on the targets.

Discussion: When the undersigned served in Vietnam, he had some contact with LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance and Patrol) teams and sniper teams, enough to conclude that such personnel were among the more effective combatants in a guerrilla warfare setting. Even then we had "star scopes" (night vision devices using ambient light amplification technologies), giving us a significant advantage in night-time contacts with the enemy. I'm sure those technologies have been significantly improved since then and that laser targeting technologies have been added to the mix.

In Vietnam we had approximately a 20-1 favorable kill ratio, even against the well trained, highly disciplined and motivated North Vietnamese regulars (that war was "lost" on the home front). Especially in the Central Highlands, the combat environment was more difficult even than the mountains of Afghanistan (no triple canopy there).

Last week there were reports that we have already had small units inside Afghanistan, including British SAS teams, for two weeks. Reportedly, they are concentrated within the area already controlled by the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. If we haven't already done so, we should also be inserting small recon and destroy teams in the southern and central parts of the country.

2. There must begin an air campaign to destroy as much as possible of the Taliban's heavier military resources.

Discussion: The Taliban have a small air force, some aging Soviet tanks and substantial quantities of artillery, mortars and rockets. Using our precision targeting capabilities and satellite intelligence, we should be able to deprive the Taliban of much of these resources in several weeks. Most of their ammunition and ordnance is probably dispersed and hidden in difficult-to-locate caves in the mountains. If they hope to use them, they have to bring them out and transport them, which will create infrared imagery we can detect, even at nighttime. Having small teams on the ground and scattered throughout the country will help focus satellite-based intelligence.

The objective of the air campaign should be to reduce the enemy to a collection of infantrymen armed with nothing more serious than AK-47's, RPG's and whatever other small weapons they can scrape up. Even our small teams should be able to hold off such forces until we can bring our heavier and more sophisticated resources to bear.

3. We should acquire or build at least two airfields inside the country capable of supporting landings by tactical warplanes and smaller cargo planes to support and provision the units assigned to establish a perimeter and protect them (a couple of brigades each, I would guess, of airborne troops or Marines). The airfields would also be used to base, maintain and refuel attack and transport helicopter forces needed for rapid reaction to enemy contacts outside base perimeters.

Discussion: The ability to react quickly to enemy sightings and attacks will be crucial to success. The bases will also tempt the Taliban, of course, to attack and destroy them. If they succumb to the temptation, they will bring into play several of our military advantages. The rule of thumb in a military situation like we face in Afghanistan is that the conventionalization of the conflict will help ensure our quick victory, and that we neutralize the advantages of indigenous guerrillas by simply declining non-critical engagements. In other words, so long as we keep in sight our mission to destroy bin Laden's organization (and, if necessary, the Taliban regime) and do not attempt the impossible task of subjugating the entire country, we cannot possibly be defeated.

4. We should leaflet the entire country to explain to the Afghanis that our quarrel is with bin Laden and the Taliban government that shelters him. The leaflets should invite members of the Taliban militia to defect by bringing themselves and their weapons to one of our airfields. The leaflets should also invite non-combatants to seek food, clothing and shelter from their American visitors in the vicinity of the airfields we have established. Defectors could be assigned the task of protecting non-combatants from Taliban retribution. The leaflets should also place a $10 million reward for bin Laden's head, on or off his shoulders, not payable, however, to any terrorist.

5. Within weeks from now, winter will put the mountains into a deep chill and make offensive operations there extremely risky. Unless large concentrations of the Taliban are spotted, we should not risk significant casualties under those conditions. We should spend the winter months taking and consolidating the foregoing measures. It might also be useful to set up a number of firebases for artillery units on some easily fortified high ground.

Discussion: I have seen reports and analyses suggesting that Taliban morale is low, that defections are already occurring at a high rate, and that, if it weren't for the tawdry reputation of some of the Northern Alliance leaders (most of them are from minority ethnic groups and have on their hands a lot of the blood of the Pashtun majority), the regime might already have fallen. The first five steps outlined above might well succeed in sparking an internal uprising that will force out the Taliban. If it does and bin Laden and his lieutenants are found and captured, or killed, we can bring in a lot more tents and clothing and food to get the Afghanis through the winter, declare victory and come home. If not, then we can prepare for an intensive campaign in the Spring to find and destroy bin Laden and his fighters and any Taliban that try to protect him.

6. In the Spring, with our artillery bases in place, with short-range and long-range tactical air support blanketing the country, and with the mobility and firepower available to us from our transport and attack helicopter fleets, our ranger, airborne and Marine infantry units can scour the Afghan countryside to locate, engage and destroy enemy units, terrorist and Taliban.

Discussion: War is hell and, even with all the advantages our soldiers have, we cannot expect this campaign to be casualty-free. There will be American dead and wounded. But it will not be another Vietnam so long as our leadership keeps its limited mission in mind and does not permit our forces to get bogged down in Afghanistan. As noted earlier, the kill ratio in Vietnam was decidedly in our favor, and the American people lost their stomach for the war primarily because most of what they were shown on television were the American casualties. I suspect the Pentagon has been absorbing that lesson for almost three decades now and will have the sense to keep the media away from most of the action.

7. No later than a year from now, regardless of the situation on the ground, we must bring our troops home.

Discussion: It is possible that bin Laden and many of his lieutenants and fighters will be able to slip out of Afghanistan and elude capture by our forces. He can bribe his way into Pakistan and be sheltered indefinitely there by his many sympathizers, some of whom, by all accounts, are senior officers in the Pakistani military. If he has still not been captured by this time next year, he probably won't be, at least not on this try. We may have other successes to point to by then, such as the fall of the Taliban regime. But, whatever the case, we must not make the mistake of playing into bin Laden's hands by overstaying our welcome in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Depending on how things develop militarily and politically, we may be able to keep a moderately sized strike force in nearby countries like Uzbekistan.

The foregoing is a battle plan, set forth principally from a military perspective. No military undertaking occurs in a vacuum, of course, and it will be critically important for our civilian leadership to understand this and to take reinforcing political measures in order not to undermine the military mission. Extreme care must be taken not to inflict casualties on non-combatants. We have B-52's able to drop hugh payloads of 2,000 lb. bombs and B-1 Stealth bombers that can fly all the way from the United States and simultaneously engage multiple targets. Such weapons should be used sparingly, if at all, and never over cities or towns or in the fertile valleys. In Vietnam we had Puff the Magic Dragon, a transport aircraft converted to close-in fire support, that looked almost like it was pouring a river of fire onto the ground it targeted. I don't know if our military still inventories that weapon (a Stinger, which the Taliban reportedly still have stocks of, could probably bring it down pretty easily), but, if we still use that fearsome weapon, we should first make sure we have hard intelligence that the proposed target is strictly military. It will not do us much good to get bin Laden if our actions in Afghanistan help radical Islamic governments take over in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt.

Finally, our diplomats must work just as hard as our soldiers and Marines. We are at war, they must emphasize over and over, neither with Islam nor with the Afghan people, but with a terrorist who, by killing innocent civilians, including hundreds of his fellow Muslims, has profaned the good name of Islam and brought the very concept of jihad into lasting disrepute. We must bring ceaseless and insistent moral, political and economic pressure on Muslim governments and Muslim scholars everywhere to repudiate this scandalous canker on the body of the Muslim community. Usama bin Laden has insulted Islam much more profoundly than Salman Rushdie ever thought of insulting it, and the most effective long-term response to the indiscriminate terrorism of Islamic radicals would be for Muslim courts to begin letting their heads roll in the sands of Arabia.

Frank Creel is Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Independent National Committee, and the Virginia contact for the Independent American Party.